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INTERNATIONAL TRANSPORT FORUM 
The International Transport Forum at the OECD is an intergovernmental organisation with 
52 member countries. It acts as a strategic think-tank, with the objective of helping shape the 
transport policy agenda on a global level and ensuring that it contributes to economic growth, 
environmental protection, social inclusion and the preservation of human life and well-being. The 
International Transport Forum organises an annual summit of Ministers along with leading 
representatives from industry, civil society and academia. 
The International Transport Forum was created under a Declaration issued by the Council of 
Ministers of the ECMT (European Conference of Ministers of Transport) at its Ministerial Session in 
May 2006 under the legal authority of the Protocol of the ECMT, signed in Brussels on 17 October 
1953, and legal instruments of the OECD.  
The Members of the Forum are: Albania, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, 
Belgium, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, 
Finland, France, FYROM, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, India, Ireland, Italy, Japan, 
Korea, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Mexico, Moldova, Montenegro, the 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, 
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, the United Kingdom and the United States.  
The International Transport Forum’s Research Centre gathers statistics and conducts co-
operative research programmes addressing all modes of transport. Its findings are widely 
disseminated and support policymaking in Member countries as well as contributing to the annual 
summit. 
Discussion Papers 
The International Transport Forum’s Discussion Paper Series makes economic research, 
commissioned or carried out at its Research Centre, available to researchers and practitioners. The 
aim is to contribute to the understanding of the transport sector and to provide inputs to transport 
policy design. The Discussion Papers are not edited by the International Transport Forum and they 
reflect the author's opinions alone. 
The Discussion Papers can be downloaded from: 
www.internationaltransportforum.org/jtrc/DiscussionPapers/jtrcpapers.html 
The International Transport Forum’s website is at: www.internationaltransportforum.org 
For further information on the Discussion Papers and other JTRC activities, please email: 
itf.contact@oecd.org  
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ROAD SAFETY AND INSURANCE MARKETS  
OVERVIEW 
 
DISCUSSION PAPER  
Dr Andrew Fronsko 
September 2011  
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Road trauma is the biggest killer of young people in the world.  Reductions in the 
incidence and severity of road related trauma is of paramount importance to society, 
aimed at reducing the personal and economic burden to injured people and flow-on 
impact to families and the broader community.    
The UN estimates that the economic cost of road trauma to developing countries alone is 
at least $100 billion per year.  The emotional cost is impossible to calculate.   Yet road 
trauma is preventable.  Australia has demonstrated that investment in road trauma 
prevention is the single most effective way of reducing the impact that it has on the 
community.    
The effective and efficient operation of insurance markets plays a vital role in improving 
road safety outcomes.  This can be achieved in areas such as the development of 
insurance products that help reduce the finance burden of injury; providing education 
and incentives to encourage safer road-user behaviour; pooling of data to help inform 
decision making and consumer choice; and, seeking to embrace collaborative efforts 
within competitive environments to provide mutual benefit to stakeholders and society. 
This paper provides a brief overview of the nature and characteristics of insurance 
markets, highlighting key challenges.  The paper aims to provide additional insight when 
developing and considering opportunities for insurance markets to deliver better road 
safety outcomes.  
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2.  OVERVIEW OF INSURANCE PRODUCTS THAT INTERSECT WITH ROAD USERS 
2.1.  Nature of Insurance 
Most forms of insurance aim to transfer the exposure to (or risk of) financial loss that an 
individual or entity (first party) sustains from an incident or event to another party 
(second party), generally the Insurer.   
An ex-ante premium is generally paid by the insuree to create the policy (or to be 
covered under an insurance scheme).  The premium pool so collected is used to fund 
benefits for eligible claimants covered under the insurance scheme/policy in the event of 
an incident or event.  Beneficiaries of insurance claims may be the first party, and/or 
another individual/entity (third party) depending on the type and characteristic of 
insurance scheme/policy. 
General features of Insurance include  
a)  Risk Transfer - legally enforceable; 
b)  Consideration – generally, premium related to risk/benefits; 
c)  Risk pool created if there are many parties ; and 
d)  Distribution of benefits from pool. 
Typically, an insurance scheme/policy has two components, subject to defined 
thresholds, caps and conditions:  
a)  Benefits that an eligible party is entitled to claim; and 
b)  Indemnification of the first party (covered by the insurance policy or scheme) with 
respect to financial losses as a result of their negligence that a beneficiary may be 
entitled to claim (to the extent that the indemnification matches the benefits). 
2.2.  Types of Insurance Utilised by Road Users 
Various types of insurance can be utilised by vehicle owners/operators and road users, 
and often are relied upon as a first resort in the event of an incident or event causing 
property damage or injury, these are shown in Table 1.   
Amongst most international jurisdictions, General Insurance is utilised to cover motor 
vehicle property damage and is often a discretionary purchase.  Casualty: Auto Liability 
or Compulsory Third Party (CTP) Insurance and Workers‟ Compensation is used is utilised 
to cover personal injury and is a generally a compulsory form of insurance (workers‟ 
compensation is sometimes utilised if the injury was sustained in a motor vehicle during 
the course of employment or journey to/from work).   
In some cases, Pubic Liability Insurance can be called upon (for example, a pedal cyclist 
injured in an accident on a public road with no ability to claim on any of the above forms 
of insurance may attempt to sue [seek damages] from the Local Authority or Road 
Authority if the accident occurred as a result of poorly maintained infrastructure).  
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Table 1: Common types of Insurance that intersect with road use 
 
Insurance Type  Description  Comment 
MAJOR INTERSECT 
Motor Vehicle 
Property  
- Third party 
- First party 
- Comprehensive 
  (1
st +3
rd party) 
 
Covers property damage and 
theft.  Insurance may be 
limited to damage to a third 
party‟s property as a result of 
fault by the owner/operator of 
the insured vehicle, and/or 
property damage or loss of the 
insured‟s vehicle (first party) 
irrespective fault.  
In most jurisdictions insurance 
is a discretionary purchase.  
Some jurisdictions (UK and 
USA) mandate a minimum 
level of third party property 
damage.  
Personal Injury:  
Auto Liability  
(Compulsory Third 
Party)  
 - Third Party (C/Law) 
 - First Party (No-Fault) 
Covers personal injury costs or 
damages incurred by a third 
party as a result of fault by the 
owner/operator of the insured 
vehicle. Some jurisdictions 
offer no-fault first party 
coverage irrespective of fault. 
Generally, compulsory for most 
types of motor vehicle to be 
legally operated on public 
road.  In many jurisdictions 
compensation is based on fault 
or negligence principles, with 
some jurisdictions offering no-
fault coverage.  
Personal Injury  
Worker’s 
Compensation 
 
Covers personal injury costs or 
damages incurred in the 
course of employment. 
Generally compulsory for 
employers over a certain size.  
In most jurisdictions 
compensation is based on no-
fault principles, with some 
jurisdictions providing add-on 
negligence based 
compensation. 
SECOND ORDER INTERSECT  
Public Liability 
Insurance 
Covers damages incurred by a 
third party through injury, 
death or property damage 
from the negligence of the 
insuree. 
In most jurisdictions insurance 
is a discretionary, with 
compensation based on fault or 
negligence principles. 
Health and disability 
Insurance 
Covers the hospital, medical 
and like expenses among 
individuals.  
May be a blend of private 
insurance, and social 
insurance.  
Unemployment 
Insurance  
Provides safety-net level of 
financial support to those who 
are unemployed before 
retirement age yet seeking 
work 
Generally delivered as a form 
of social insurance and may be 
means tested to determine 
eligibility. 
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2.3.  Key Characteristics of Insurance Products 
 
Key characteristics of the Australian insurance market are explored below and 
summarised in Table 2 for the purposes of comparison. 
2.3.1. Adequacy Objective 
Insurance Type  Description 
Individual Adequacy   
 
-  Premiums largely determined on an actuarial basis 
-  Redistributive amongst insurees 
-  Standard model for competitive insurance market 
Social Adequacy 
 
-  Public tax-transfer system 
-  Benefits related to needs 
-  Social assistance/welfare 
 
Most insurance products are risk rated at least to some extent, in that the premium 
charged to individual is reflective of their risk (individual adequacy).  As it is expensive 
and impractical to collect detailed information at an individual level to determine risk 
exposure and behaviour, for the purposes of premium determination, similar groups 
(cohorts) of an estimated  to be of a similar risk profile are determined using one or more 
rating factors. This implies that cross-subsidies within cohorts will exist (and potentially 
between rating cohorts).  
 
The Social Adequacy objective is generally associated with social insurance schemes that 
generally provide cover the whole community as a form of social assistance or welfare.  
The following definitions are helpful in attempting to define social insurance: 
 
.. the purpose of social security should be to ensure to everyone up to a 
sustenance level of income, in return for compulsory contributions … the main 
instrument to achieve this was to be unified and compulsory social insurance, 
through which benefits would be paid out in return for premiums 
(Lord Beveridge 1942; summarised by Lundholm 1991).  
 
… insurance characterised by the notion that the obligation to pay contributions 
and taxes brings entitlement to a share in social welfare when we are in need of 
it. The main aim is to guarantee the population a certain level of security in their 
lives (Försäkringskassan, Sweden 2001). 
2.3.2. Funding 
A fully funded premium when collected for an underwriting period is adequate to cover 
the expected total cost of claims as they are incurred and ultimately paid.  In many 
forms of social insurance, premiums are levied to cover only the expected cost of claims 
payments during a period of time (pay-as-you-go or PAYG), the key challenge being 
intergenerational risk transfers if the premium collected does not yet match the liability 
incurred for the collection period (especially for long tail no-fault insurance schemes). 
2.3.3. Community Rating 
In a pure community rated scheme, individuals pay the same premium (or proportional 
amount relative to their income) irrespective of their risk.  Where no community rating 
applies, premiums can be set based on the insured‟s risk (risk-rated).  It is possible to 
have a blend – for example, in CTP insurance in New South Wales, Australia (privately  
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underwritten), premiums for each class of vehicle are set on a risk-rated assessment of 
an individual‟s psycho-demographic characteristics and risk exposure, but subject to 
restrictions on premium loadings or discounts.  
2.3.4. Underwriting 
The underwriting of an insurance scheme may be undertaken by either the private sector 
(where shareholders supply capital and bear the financial risk
1).  In contrast, insurance 
schemes may be underwritten by entities owned by the government or public sector 
(e.g., the Transport Accident Commission, Victoria, Australia) where either an explicit or 
implicit financial guarantee applies. 
2.3.5. Typical Exposure 
In long-tailed insurance classes, such as personal injury compensation schemes, there 
may be many years between the time the claim is made and ultimately paid/finalised 
(e.g., 4+ years on average).  In contrast, with short-tailed schemes such as motor 
vehicle property damage insurance, claims are generally reported and paid within a short 
period of time (typically less than one year from the accident date). 
2.3.6. Beneficiary Party 
The beneficiary of an insurance policy may be the first party (in the case of automobile 
insurance the owner or operator of the motor vehicle covered by the insurance 
scheme/policy), or a third party who suffers loss or injury as a result of negligence or 
actions of the first party. 
2.3.7. Claim Order  
In some insurance schemes/ policies, the entitlement to access benefits under the policy 
is not dependent of other sources of insurance or funds the insured may be able to call 
upon.  These are referred to as first-resort schemes, and include CTP Insurance and most 
General Insurance products.  Some schemes/policies can be accessed only after all other 
avenues are exhausted (last-resort), or subject to means testing with respect to first 
seeking reliance on ones‟ own wealth or income generating capacity before a claim can 
be made.    
2.3.8. Participation 
Some forms of insurance are compulsory (such as CTP Insurance), whereas others can 
be a discretionary purchase (such as General Insurance), noting there may be a blended 
approach such a requiring a minimum level of General Insurance coverage for certain 
activities (in most US jurisdictions a minimum level of third party motor vehicle property 
damage insurance is required to legally operate a motor vehicle on a public road).  
Universal coverage generally applies to social insurance schemes where the entire 
community is provided cover (such as unemployment insurance, or accident insurance as 
applies in New Zealand and Saskatchewan).  
                                                           
1    In privately and publicly underwritten schemes in Australia, the financial risk of insurer insolvency or liability 
arsing from uninsured, unidentified vehicles rests with the government or responsible agency.   
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Table 2: Characteristics of Insurance in the Australia Market   
 
Segment / 
Characteri
stic 
General(Mot
or) 
Insurance 
Auto 
Liability 
(CTP) 
Insuran
ce 
Workers’ 
Compensat
ion 
Insurance 
Public 
Liability 
Insuranc
e 
Private 
Health 
and 
Disability 
Insuranc
e 
Social 
Health 
Insuran
ce 
Unemploym
ent 
Insurance 
Adequacy 
Objective 
Individual  Hybrid  Hybrid  Individual  Individual  Social  Social 
Funding  Fully Funded  Fully 
Funded 
Fully Funded  Fully 
Funded 
Fully 
Funded 
PAYG  PAYG 
Communit
y Rating 
No  Partial  No  No  No  Yes  Yes   
Underwriti
ng 
Private  Blend  Blend  Private  Private  Public  Public 
Typical 
Exposure 
Short Tail  Long Tail  Long Tail  Med-Long 
Tail 
Short Tail  Long Tail  Long Tail 
Beneficiar
y Party 
First  Third + 
First  
Third + First   Third  First  First  First 
Claim 
Order 
First Resort   First 
Resort 
First Resort  First 
Resort 
First call 
on 
CTP/WC 
First 
Resort  
First call 
on  
CTP/WC 
Last 
Resort 
Means 
Tested 
First call 
on 
CTP/WC  
Last Resort 
Means 
Tested 
First call on 
CTP/WC 
Participati
on 
Discretionary  Compuls
ory 
Compulsory  Discretion
ary 
Discretion
ary 
Universa
l 
Universal 
Source: Fronsko 2011 
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3.  INSURANCE & MOTIVES FOR SAFE ROAD USER BEHAVIOUR 
3.1.  Moral Hazard 
Whilst insurance provides social utility through the protection of the assets of the 
insured, there is an argument that the indemnification of the insured may dull incentives 
for safe behaviour.  This is often referred as “moral hazard” in that the insured has an 
economic incentive to cause the situation he/she is insured against, an incentive that is 
not present when he/she is not insured (Mehr, Cammack and Rose 1985, Shavell 1986). 
The nature of CTP Insurance schemes in providing third party coverage make the 
dynamics of moral hazard complicated, given the injured party may not offer have full 
control of the environment and circumstances relating to the accident/injury and the first 
party is generally indemnified against financial loss.  With respect to public safety, the 
regulation and enforcement of the environment and codification of duties of care and 
responsibilities through Road Safely legislation reinforce incentives for safe behaviours.  
Moreover, it is likely that factors such as self-preservation of life and societal attitudes 
reinforce motives for safe behaviour for both first and third parties.  Thus, there are 
powerful ameliorating factors that can guard against the risk of public safety being 
compromised due to the existence of a compensation scheme with first party 
indemnification (Fronsko 2001, p27).   
Notwithstanding, a number of policy and regulatory responses can be effected to guard 
against this hazard, including:  
-  Mandate partial coverage in insurance contracts, or impose deductibles and thresholds  
-  Insurance contracts to stipulate duties on the insured, and penalties for breaches. 
3.2.  Judgement Proof Problem 
There is an argument that injurers may lack the assets to pay fully the amount (to the 
injured) for which they are liable.  This may lead to a propensity not to purchase liability 
insurance and with limited financial assets at risk could lead to a tendency for injurers to 
engage in excessive risky activities and to fail to exercise adequate care when doing so 
(Shavell 1986).  A social issue therefore arises - the risk that victims are not fully 
compensated for losses.  
This is a key motive for mandating compulsion in motor vehicle liability insurance, in 
particular that for personal injury.  
A number of criticisms of the judgement proof problem have been raised. The argument 
fails to recognise incentives for preservation of one‟s own life/health (or negative 
externality impacts to loved ones) in evaluating motives to avoid risky activity/behaviour.  
It also ignores merits of first party insurance and assumes tort remedy is optimal for 
behavioural incentives. 
A summary of potential policy responses to issues identified above is presented at Table 
3.1 below.    
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Table 3.1: Potential Policy Reponses to Moral Hazard and Judgement Proof Problem   
Potential Policy Response  
 
Injurer‟s excessive 
engagement in risky 
activity & dulling of 
incentives to take 
adequate care 
Inadequate 
compensation 
by injurers (to 
victims) 
a.  Mandate purchase liability [third party] insurance     
b.  Prohibit purchase of liability [third party] insurance 
for certain high-risk activities  
   
c.  Minimum level of assets to engage in a risky 
activity [potentially subject to (d) below] 
   
d.  Extension of liability to parties related to the injurer  
(e.g employer liability,  joint & several action) 
   
e.  Safety Regulation     
f.  Civil and Criminal penalties     
g.  Prohibition of risky activities     
h.  Victims mandated to obtain [first party] insurance     
Adapted from Shavell 1986 
 
In Australia, road safety and traffic legislation and associated regulations, mandate 
minimum safety standards for motor vehicles, and registered motor vehicle categories 
that may legally operate in public places.  Legislation also provides civil and criminal 
penalties for inappropriate road user behaviours and activities (such as speeding, driving 
under the influence of drugs and alcohol, mobile phone use while driving, failure to wear 
a seat belt or helmet, etc).  More recently in Australia there has been a move to provide 
additional powers to police and the courts to manage risky anti-social behaviour such as 
hoon-driving - refer for example, the recently introduced Anti-Hoon Driver legislation in 
Victoria, allows police or the courts to immobilise or impound vehicles involved (State 
Government Victoria 2011).  
In concert with the above, statutory and private insurance markets in Australia have 
responded in various ways to address residual risks associated with moral hazard 
through the provision of financial incentives and benefit reductions to encourage safe 
road user behaviours.  To illustrate, a brief summary of regimes that operate in Victoria 
Australia is provided at Table 3.2 below, noting the extension of incentives into the 
licensing system to reward long-standing safe driver behaviour.  
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Table 3.2: Incentive and Disincentive regimes impacting motor vehicle owners and operators in Victoria, Australia
 2 
 
Transaction  Financial Incentives  Reductions on Benefits/Eligibility  Policy Exclusions  Excess 
Compulsory Third 
Party (liability insurance 
for bodily injury) 
 
Transport Accident 
Commission 
Not Applicable  
 
(CTP premiums in Victoria are 
community rated by vehicle class and 
zone, without regard to prior driving 
record/experience) 
 
 
 
 
-  Exemption from no-fault entitlements for loss of 
earnings may apply if convinced of certain offences 
under the Road Safety Act, or the vehicle was 
unregistered or the driver was not holding a current 
licence, or the incident resulted in being convicted of an 
indictable offence [s.40(1)]. 
-  Exemption or reduction in Loss of earnings, loss of 
earning capacity and impairment benefits may apply for 
road offences (including prescribed reductions for 
offences within certain BAC bands) [s.40(1)-(6)]. 
-  Generally courts will apply a reduction of about 25% 
contributory negligence in common law awards for 
failure to wear a seatbelt/helmet
3. 
-  Motor sport accidents [s.41]. 
-  unregistered/uninsured 
motor vehicles on private 
land [s.41A,B]. 
-  Medical Excess (circa 
$500).  
General Damage 
(Property) Insurance 
(discretionary purchase) 
 
Risk rated premium setting generally 
applies, taking into account prior driving 
record/experience. No claim discounts 
may apply in premium pricing.  
Experienced drivers with a very good 
driving record (Rating 1), premium 
discounts of up to 60% may apply, and 
be maintained for life regardless of future 
claims being made. 
-  Generally, a breach of policy conditions results in total, 
rather than partial exclusion from benefits (and may 
open the path for recovery action by third parties). 
-  In some instances, drivers not protected by Rating-1 for 
life benefits, may elect not to claim if they are at-fault to 
protect no-claim discounts.  
-  Exclusions may apply for 
policy breaches, such as 
driving unlicensed/ 
unregistered, if the incident 
results in being convicted of 
a road traffic offence (ie 
speeding, drink driving, etc).  
Claim excesses may apply as 
determined by the purchaser at 
policy inception, (typically 
consumers elect for $300-$500).  
The premium charged s 
reflective of the policy excess.   
Licensing 
 
From 2006, Victorian permit/licence 
holders with a good driving record, over 
a three year period are rewarded with a 
25% discount on their licence renewal 
fee under the Driver Reward Scheme.  
Accumulation of demerit points for road traffic  offences over 
a period of time may result in suspension of licence  
Not applicable  Not applicable 
                                                           
2 Refer Appendix 3.1 for relevant extracts from the Transport Accident Act 1986 (Vic), and Appendix 3.2 for summary of the demerit point regime for licensing 
in Victoria.  
3 In Common Law CTP Schemes in and NSW, Qld, awards for damages are reduced by a mandatory 25% for failure to wear a seatbelt or helmet.  
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4.  INSURANCE MARKET DYNAMICS - RESIDUAL ISSUES 
 
Whilst insurance schemes and markets can be structured and regulated to address moral 
hazard risks, a number of residual challenges remain to ensure alignment with road 
safety outcomes, summarised in table 4 below. 
Table 4: Potential Reponses to Residual Issues associated with Insurance Market Dynamics  
Theme / Issue  Cause/Consequences  Potential Responses 
Adverse Selection
4     
Individual risk rating is too 
expensive leading to 
information asymmetry 
between the insured and 
insurer. 
Cross subsidisation may be 
imposed as an instrument of 
redistribution of welfare or 
wealth which may weaken or 
be in conflict with price 
signalling incentives for safe 
vehicle selection and road 
user behaviours. 
-  undisclosed/ unknown risky 
behaviours of the insured, 
may lead to Ineffectual price 
signalling, and good risks 
pricing out bad leading to 
insurer financial instability. 
-  Consumers with propensity to 
undertake extreme risk 
activities may be attracted to 
insurance schemes offering 
benefits/identification for 
those activities (eg motor 
racing), leading to loss of 
disincentives for risk 
behaviours and potential 
insurer/scheme financial 
instability. 
-  Community rating of 
premiums may result in 
consumer selection of more 
vulnerable motor vehicle 
classes than would otherwise 
be the case were premiums 
more reflective of risk or cost 
(eg motorcycles). 
-  Application of excesses on 
certain benefits/ 
indemnities before claims 
under an insurance policy 
can be evoked. 
-  Mandate disclosure and 
minimum level of insurance 
coverage for certain high-
risk activities. 
-  Accept that cross-subsidies 
exist. 
                                                           
4   Potentially, under adverse selection, compulsion can be Pareto improving if additional insurance 
coverage is allowed. Under moral hazard, compulsion can be Pareto improving: to provide 
improvement compulsion has to prohibit purchase of additional insurance coverage (Lundholm 
1991)  
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Theme / Issue  Cause/Consequences  Potential Responses 
Market Imperfections      
Missing markets.  
Lack of economies leading to 
high transactional costs. 
-  Private Insurance markets 
immature, hence inaccessible 
to consumers seeking 
insurance coverage to 
conduct certain activities. 
-  Private insurance markets 
either unwilling or unable to 
bear the risk for certain 
activities/ consumer cohorts 
leading to accessibility and 
affordability constraints. 
-  Mandate minimum level of 
insurance coverage to 
create critical mass. 
-  Consider public monopoly 
underwriting.  
Consumer Ignorance and 
Irrationality    
   
Mitigate reasons why 
persons do not purchase 
insurance, or undertake risky 
activities or behaviours.  
 
-  Irrationality e.g. consumers‟ 
probability of loss estimates 
can be erroneous (Diamond, 
1977; Feldstein, 1977), 
leading to propensity to 
engage in risky activities and 
behaviours. 
-  Ignorance and high cost of 
public choice and information 
accessibility (Diamond, 
1977), leading to propensity 
not to purchase insurance.  
-  Mandate minimum level of 
insurance coverage for 
certain activities, 
-  Regulation or issue 
guidelines to ensure 
consumers are 
appropriately informed on 
the accessibility of 
insurance. 
-  Prohibition of risky activities 
and behaviours supported 
by enforcement. 
-  Public education and 
information and 
dissemination of 
information on road trauma 
hazards and promotion of 
safer road user attitudes 
and behaviours. 
-  Mandate restriction of 
vehicle types for 
inexperienced 
drivers/riders
5   
                                                           
5    For example, in Victoria, learner and probationary riders are only allowed to ride motorcycles and 
scooters on the list of approved motorcycles for novice riders under the Learner Approved 
Motorcycle Scheme (LAMS) – refer Appendix 4.  
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Theme / Issue  Cause/Consequences  Potential Responses 
Competitive Dynamics     
Economic imperative for 
insurers to benefit 
shareholders in the short-
term as a key priority, rather 
than broader societal benefit 
which may have longer term 
return. 
There may exist an incentive 
to maintain/encourage 
information asymmetries to 
protect competitive 
advantage, and push bad 
risks to competitors rather 
than investing is system-
wide solutions. 
-  Insurer‟s short-term profit 
motive may  weaken 
incentives to invest initiatives 
that yield larger benefit in the 
longer-term 
-  Insurers may have financial 
incentive to invest in road 
safety initiatives that benefit 
their own client-
base/portfolio, in preference 
to initiative that impact the 
broader community where 
competitors may also benefit 
from that initiative.  
-  Levy premiums to fund 
public safety improvement 
initiatives (relative to the 
risk being underwritten) 
that generate long term 
community benefit
6. 
-  Mandate submission of 
select datasets to a central 
repository for public use 
and analysis. 
-  Coordination on road safety 
related activities that 
insurers may conduct on 
their client base, to ensure 
alignment of campaigns 
across the industry and 
juristic ions to leverage 
maximum impact (refer 
ferromagnetism metaphor 
in section 6 below).   
                                                           
6  In this instance, benefits may be calculated on societal benefit, rather than benefit to the insurer.  
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5.  PUBLIC VS PRIVATE UNDERWRITING 
 
While it is prudent for government (public) insurers to be financially viable and generate 
a reasonable return on capital, they often have a “whole of scheme” approach, with 
performance goals more likely to be aligned to the achievement of legislative objectives, 
which include both financial and social objectives.  
As such, public insurers may take longer term view when it comes to road safety 
investments (e.g., forgo lower short-term profits to invest in road safety programs, with 
the view to reap longer term benefits in lower premiums and lower societal health and 
disability costs). The objectives typically associated with Private and Public Underwriting 
are illustrated in Figure 1, below. 
 
Private
Underwriting
Public
Underwriting
Statutory Insurance 
Schemes
Typical Objectives
•Profit Maximisation
•Subsidiary Objectives 
that are aligned to 
profit maximisation (eg 
injury prevention)
Typical Objectives
• Long term [financial] viability
• Injury prevention and trauma reduction
• Fair and equitable benefits
• Speedy, sustainable and cost effective rehabilitation
• Affordable premiums 
 
Figure 1. Typical Objectives of Public and Private Underwriting in Statutory Insurance Scheme 
 
 
6.  COMPETITIVE FEDERALISM: A POLICY LENS FOR IDEA GENERATION 
 
In light of the above, what can be done to encourage insurance markets and/or 
incentivise insurers to operate in a manner to improve road safety outcomes to the 
broader community? 
Using the lens of “competitive federalism”, insurance schemes (and insurers) are viewed 
as having freedom to adapt and respond to needs specific to their jurisdiction (or 
shareholder risk preferences).  
A competitive federalism model as it operates in Australia, in theory, allows schemes to 
adapt and respond to needs specific to the jurisdictional, and provides the opportunity to 
act as “policy laboratories” that over time jurisdictions may identify and gravitate to 
policies that demonstrate success (Victorian Government 2003 pp.2-3, Osborne 1988) or  
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stand the test of time. It also provides the opportunity to learn from policy failures in 
other jurisdictions (Jewett 2001, Fronsko 1999). 
The key challenge under the competitive federalism approach is to minimise the risk of 
destructive competition and coordination failure with respect to road safety outcomes.  
To this extent, there is merit in developing and array of cooperative arrangements within 
the insurance system (with impetus from regulators as appropriate) that may include, 
and not in order of priority: 
-  clear articulation of accountabilities within the road safety system (refer Appendices  
as  an example);  
-  integrated cooperative frameworks to develop and oversee the implementation of 
various reform measures; 
-  improve the accessibility of information to the public to make informed choices; 
-  public education where ignorance or irrationality of risk assessment may be present;  
-  pooling of scheme data to assist with risk identification, policy development, public 
education and informed consumer choice; 
-  benchmarking activities (process and performance) …working group exchanges to 
share key lessons that can be broadly levered across many jurisdictions; and 
-  coordination of micro-activities among insurers to amplify impact (refer illustrative 
metaphor below)  
External Influence  
Figure 2.  Ferromagnetism Metaphor  
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 GLOSSARY (DEFINITIONS)  
Add-on No-Fault  Under add-on no-fault approach, the underlying scheme is 
common law (without restriction to sue the at-fault party or 
recover non-economic loss) and a select set of first-party 
coverage benefits are simply added on. 
Contributory 
Negligence 
Reduction of damages based on the plaintiff's failure to take 
reasonable care for his or her own safety and well-being that 
contributes to the injuries suffered, the accident causing the 
damage, or the occurrence of a situation in which injuries are 
foreseeable (Butterworths. Australian Legal Dictionary).  
Common Law  The system of laws developed by successive decisions of the 
courts and the role of precedent (Industry Commission 
1994). 
Compulsory Third 
Party (CTP) 
Insurance 
Indemnity for liability incurred with respect to death or bodily 
injury, and access to economic and non-economic 
compensation to first party bodily injury for eligible claimants 
injured in a motor vehicle accident.  
Fault (at-fault)  Negligence; an error or defect in judgment or conduct; any 
deviation from prudenance, duty, or rectitude; any 
shortcoming or negligent care or performance resulting from 
inattention, incapacity, or perversity; a wrong tendency, 
course or act; bad faith or mismanagement; neglect of duty 
(Black 1991, p.608)   
First Party  The person [party] responsible for the accident. 
Hazard  A condition that may create or increase the chance of loss 
arising from a given peril (Mehr, Cammack and Rose 1985, p. 
23). 
Modified No-Fault  Under a modified no-fault approach, a set of compensation 
benefits is provided without regard to fault.  However, the 
injured party retains the ability to sue the [at-fault] third party 
for certain damages that are in excess of no-fault entitlements, 
provided the injury meets or exceeds a certain threshold. 
Moral Hazard  An individual characteristic of the insured that is indifferent to 
loss ie “what‟s there to worry about, I‟ve got insurance” (Mehr, 
Cammack and Rose 1985, p. 23).  
Morale Hazard  An individual characteristic of the insured that increases the 
probability of loss arising from dishonesty of the insured, eg 
arson loss (Mehr, Cammack and Rose 1985, p. 23). 
Negligence  The omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided 
by those ordinary considerations with ordinarily regulate 
human affairs, would do, or the doing something which a 
reasonable and prudent man would not do. 
The law of negligence is founded on reasonable conduct or 
reasonable care under all circumstances.  The Doctrine of 
negligence rests on duty of care of every person in his conduct  
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towards others from which an injury may result (Black 1991, p. 
1032). 
 
 
 
No-Fault  A type of automobile insurance in which each persons‟ insurer 
pays for injury or damage up to a certain limit regardless 
whether the insured was actually at-fault (adapted from Black 
1991, p. 1048).  
Lack of legal blameworthiness (Industry Commission 1994). 
Peril  Cause of Loss (Mehr, Cammack and Rose, 1985). 
 
Second Party  The Insurer that underwrites the Third Party (or First Party) 
CTP Insurance Policy.   
Statutory 
Compensation  
Scheme 
A scheme or arrangement that is: (i) established by an 
Australian law; and (ii) under which compensation is payable 
for particular kinds of injury, loss or damage; and (iii) that is 
specified in the regulations or that is of a kind specified in the 
regulations (definition used by Australian Tax Office). 
Strict Liability  Liability without fault (Black 1991, p. 1422). 
Liability for damages without need to prove negligence or fault.  
The defendant is liable irrespective of an absence of negligence 
or intention on his/her part and even if he or she took 
reasonable care to prevent damages (Butterworths. Australian 
Legal Dictionary). 
Third Party  Person(s) [party] injured by the [at-fault] first party. 
Tort / Delict  A private or civil wrong, independent of contract, arising from 
wilful or negligent misconduct in breach of duty owed to an 
injured person (Industry Commission 1994). 
A private or civil wrong or injury, including action for bad faith 
breach of contract, for which the court will provide remedy in 
the form of an action for damages (Black 1991, p.1489). 
Tort (Negligence) / 
Delict 
The tort or negligence consists of the existence of a legal duty 
owed to the plaintiff by the defendant and breach of this duty, 
there being a proximate causal relationship between the breach 
and the plaintiffs injury, and damages (adapted from Black 
1991, p.1489).  
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APPENDIX 1 
National Road Safety Strategy 2011-2020 
Australia 
http://www.atcouncil.gov.au/documents/files/NRSS_2011_2020_20May11.pdf  
[extract] 
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APPENDIX 2 
 
POLICY HANDBOOK ON NATURAL HAZARD AWARENESS AND DISASTER RISK REDUCTION EDUCATION 
(2010)  
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/24/51/42221773.pdf 
[extract] 
 
Roles of stakeholders 
Long-term strategic planning and cross-sectoral collaboration are fundamental components of 
successful education programs for risk awareness and reduction. Many stakeholders have a role to 
play and responsibilities in this respect: the parallel and collaborative actions of international 
organisations, governmental bodies, insurance sector representatives, corporate leaders, civil 
society organisations, and educational institutions should be encouraged. 
 
Role of public sector. The public sector, at all levels (local, regional, national, and supranational), 
should take a leading role. The public sector‟s roles and responsibilities largely depend on the 
scope and level of hazards and vulnerabilities, existing initiatives, and available resources. The 
public sector should first set priorities and then focus on coordination and leadership in the 
development of national or regional programs and policies: public awareness campaigns, 
informational websites and the distribution of educational material are among the available tools. 
Support should also be granted to existing programs at local and community level, as well as to 
private and civic sector initiatives. Special attention should be devoted to the opportunity to 
incorporate risk awareness and reduction strategies into school curricula and higher-level 
educational programs. The provision of fiscal incentives (e.g., tax subsidies) may bring attention to 
cost-effective risk mitigation measures at the individual or business level. 
 
Role of private sector. Private sector initiatives can play an important role; for instance, the 
research, advocacy and public education efforts of international reinsurers and national insurance 
companies can provide significant sectoral leadership in developing and promoting physical and 
financial protection tools for catastrophic risk. Leadership by example can also be provided by 
corporations through the adoption of employee education programs, risk reduction measures, and 
business continuity plans. 
 
Role of civic sector. Independent civic organisations and public-civic partnerships addressing 
natural hazard awareness and disaster risk reduction at community level should be promoted.  
Grassroots efforts are grounded in the local physical, cultural, economic and political context of a 
community and they can prove to be extremely effective even if sometimes they may lack 
sufficient human capital and economic resources. Partnerships with the civic sector, therefore, 
should be supported and enhanced as part of a holistic, top-down and bottom-up integration 
strategy. Support should also be provided to community-level preparedness by ensuring that 
appropriate emergency supplies are available, thus helping well-prepared communities to act as 
the first line of defence. 
 
Role of international organisations. International organisations and regional and international 
collaborations can help focus the attention of national governments and policy makers on the 
importance of natural hazards awareness and disaster risk reduction education programs. 
International organisations have a key role to play with regard to long-term planning as they are 
decoupled from the shorter-term political mandates of national, local and local decision-makers. 
International efforts may also lead to the establishment of transnational platforms and networks 
aimed at developing a coherent cross-border approach to disaster risk management strategies.  
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APPENDIX 3.1 
 
TRANSPORT ACCIDENT ACT 1986 (VIC.) – SECTION 40 
Circumstances in which certain compensation
7 is not payable or is reduced 
 
(1)  The Commission is not liable to pay compensation under section 44 or 45 to a 
person who is injured as a result of a transport accident if- 
 
(a)  the person- 
 
(i)  was driving a motor vehicle at the time of the transport accident; and 
 
(ii)  is convicted, in respect of driving the motor vehicle at that time, of an 
offence under section 49(1)(a) of the Road Safety Act 1986 or under a law 
that is, in relation to that Act, a corresponding law- unless the person 
satisfies the Commission that the intoxicating liquor or drug did not 
contribute in any way to the transport accident; or 
 
(b)  the person was, at the time of the transport accident, the driver of, or a 
passenger in, a motor vehicle owned by the person in respect of which a 
transport accident charge payable in respect of a period including that time had 
not been paid; or 
 
(c)  the person was, at the time of the transport accident, the driver of a motor 
vehicle and- 
 
(i)  had never held a licence to drive a motor vehicle of that class under the 
Road Safety Act 1986 or a corresponding previous enactment or under a 
law that is in relation to the Road Safety Act 1986 a corresponding law or 
under a law of another country; or 
 
(ii)  held or had held such a licence but, at the time of the transport accident, 
it was suspended or had been cancelled; or 
 
(iii)  in the case of a transport accident occurring on or after the 
commencement of section 12 of the Transport Accident (Amendment) Act 
2000, held or had held such a licence but, at the time of the transport 
accident, it had not been renewed for at least 3 years; or 
 
(d)  the person-  
 
(i)  was, at the time of the transport accident, the driver of or a passenger in 
a motor vehicle being used for or in connection with or in the commission 
of an indictable offence, stealing or attempting to steal a motor vehicle, 
resisting or preventing the lawful apprehension or detention of that 
                                                           
7   s.44 = Total loss of earnings, s.45 = Partial loss of earnings, s.47 = Impairment benefit, s.48 
Impairment benefit where more than one accident involved, s.49 = Total loss of earning capacity, 
s.50 -Partial loss of earning capacity, s.51 = Loss of earning capacity-non-earners  
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person or any other person or intentionally causing or attempting to 
cause injury to that person or any other person; and 
 
ii) is convicted of that offence. 
 
(2)  The Commission is not liable to pay compensation under section 44, 45, 47, 49, 50 
or 51
8 to a person who is injured in a transport accident if the person- 
 
(a)  was driving a motor vehicle at the time of the transport accident; and 
 
(b)  is convicted of an offence in relation to the transport accident under 
49(1)(ba),(c),(ca),(d),(e),(ea) or (eb),56(2) or 56(7) of the Road Safety Act 
1986  or under a law that is, in relation to that Act, a corresponding law. 
 
(3)  The Commission is not liable to pay compensation under section 47, 49, 50 or 51 to 
a person who is injured in a transport accident if the person was driving a motor 
vehicle at the time of the transport accident and is convicted, in respect of driving 
the motor vehicle at that time- 
 
(a)  of an offence under section 49(1)(a) of the Road Safety Act 1986  or under a 
law that is, in relation to that Act, a corresponding law; or 
 
(b)  of an offence under section 49(1)(b), 49(1)(f) or 49(1)(g) of the Road Safety 
Act 1986  or under a law that is, in relation to that Act, a corresponding law and 
the relevant level of concentration of alcohol in the person's blood was 0×24 
grams or more per 100 millilitres of blood or in the person's breath was 0×24 
grams or more per 210 litres of exhaled air, as the case requires- unless the 
person satisfies the Commission that the intoxicating liquor or drug or the 
concentration of alcohol in the blood or breath, as the case may be, did not 
contribute in any way to the transport accident. 
 
(4) Subsection(5) applies if a person who is injured in a transport accident was driving a 
motor vehicle at the time of the transport accident and is convicted in respect of 
driving the motor vehicle at that time- 
 
(a)  of an offence under section 49(1)(b), 49(1)(f) or 49(1)(g) of the Road Safety 
Act 1986  or under a law that is in relation to that Act, a corresponding law; and 
 
(b)  the relevant level of concentration of alcohol in the person's blood was more 
than 0×05 grams per 100 millilitres of blood or in the person's breath was more 
than 0×05 grams per 210 litres of exhaled air, as the case requires. 
 
(4A) Subsection (5A) applies if a person who is injured in a transport accident was 
driving a motor vehicle at the time of the transport accident and is convicted in 
respect of driving the motor vehicle at the time of an offence under section 
                                                           
8   s.44 = Total loss of earnings, s.45 = Partial loss of earnings, s.47 = Impairment benefit, s.48 
Impairment benefit where more than one accident involved, s.49 = Total loss of earning capacity, 
s.50 -Partial loss of earning capacity, s.51 = Loss of earning capacity-non-earners  
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49(1)(bb), (h) or (i) of the Road Safety Act 1986 or under a law that is in relation to 
that Act a corresponding law. 
 
(5)  The compensation under section 44 or 45  in respect of a person to whom 
subsection (4) applies- 
 
(a)  is reduced by one-third if the concentration was more than 0.05 and less than 
0.12; and 
 
(b)  is reduced by two-thirds if the concentration was 0.12 or more and less than 
0.24; and 
 
(c)  is not payable if the concentration was 0.24 or more- unless the person satisfies 
the Commission that the concentration of alcohol in the blood or breath of the 
person did not contribute in any way to the transport accident. 
 
(5A) The compensation under section 44 or 45 in respect of a person to whom 
subsection (4A) applies is reduced by one-third unless the person satisfies the 
Commission that the concentration of drugs in the blood of the person did not 
contribute in any way to the transport accident. 
 
(6)  For the purposes of subsection (1), a person who drives a motor vehicle at a 
particular time is not to be deemed never to have held a licence to drive a motor 
vehicle of that class if at that time- 
 
(a)  the person was- 
 
(i)  the holder of a learner permit in respect of a motor vehicle of that class 
under the Road Safety Act 1986  or under a law that is, in  relation to 
that Act, a corresponding law; or 
 
(ii)  participating in a training program accredited under the Road Safety Act 
1986; and 
 
(b)  in the case of a motor vehicle other than a motor cycle or a tractor, the person 
had a licensed driver (not being the holder of a licence issued on probation) 
sitting beside him or her. 
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Appendix 3.2 
 
Drivers Licence Demerit Point Regime: Victoria, Australia 
Demerit points are a form of penalty imposed when certain traffic offences are 
committed. Demerit points range from one to 10 points per offence. 
When issued with a learner permit/driver licence motorists commence with zero demerit 
points. Demerit points accumulate for certain offences (refer table below). A fine may 
also be imposed together with demerit points. Demerit points are valid for three years 
from the date of the offence. 
If a: 
-  full driver licence accumulates 12 or more demerit points in any 3 year period; or  
-  learner permit or probationary driver licence accumulates 5 or more demerit points in 
any 12 month period or 12 or more demerit points in any 3 year period, 
there is formal notification from the Licensing Authority (VicRoads), with the following 
option notice  
Option 1: Keep permit / licence, subject to future good behaviour  
You can elect to keep your licence but you must not accumulate any other demerit points 
during a 12 month period specified on your option notice or your permit/licence will be 
suspended for double the time that it would have been suspended under option 2. 
 
Option 2: Suspend permit / licence  
If you choose option 2 you do not need to respond to the option notice. Your licence 
suspension will start on the date specified in this notice. The suspension period will be 
three months for the first 12 points (or 5 points if you have a learner permit or 
probationary licence) plus one month for every additional four points listed in the option 
notice. 
 
Demerit Point Offences  No. of Points 
Drink-drive offences in situations where the licence/permit has not been 
cancelled: 
  Drivers subject to zero blood alcohol concentration (BAC), with a BAC 
of less than .05.  
  Drivers subject to .05 BAC, with a BAC of less than .07. 
10 
  Exceed speed limit by 45 km/h or more*   8 
  Exceed speed limit by 35 km/h or more but less than 45km/h*   6 
  Exceed speed limit by 25 km/h or more but less than 35 km/h*  
  Rail level crossing offences  
  Drive fatigue regulated heavy vehicle in contravention of maximum 
work requirement - critical risk offence  
  Drive fatigue regulated heavy vehicle in contravention of minimum rest 
requirement - critical risk offence 
4 
  Exceed speed limit by 10 km/h or more but less than 25 km/h*  
  Disobey traffic lights, signs or police directing traffic  
  Fail to give way or stop  
  Ride motorcycle without wearing a helmet or improperly carrying a 
3  
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Demerit Point Offences  No. of Points 
pillion/sidecar passenger  
  Drive without wearing a seat belt, or a properly adjusted and fastened 
seat belt  
  Drive with an unrestrained passenger  
  Drive with a passenger in or on a part of a vehicle not designed for 
passengers  
  Drive the wrong way on a one way service road  
  Drive on the wrong side of double lines or a divided road  
  Drive over double lines surrounding a painted island  
  Risk colliding with alighting, boarding or waiting tram passengers  
  Drive fatigue regulated heavy vehicle while impaired by fatigue  
  Drive fatigue regulated heavy vehicle in contravention of maximum 
work requirement - severe risk offence  
  Drive fatigue regulated heavy vehicle in contravention of minimum rest 
requirement - severe risk offence  
  Drive contrary to a major defect notice  
  Careless driving  
  Use a mobile phone in a vehicle when prohibited from doing so  
  Drive a probationary prohibited vehicle (probationary drivers)  
  Fail to display P plates  
  Disobey passenger restrictions (probationary drivers)  
  Ride a motorcycle other than a learner approved motorcycle contrary to 
licence requirements  
  Ride a motorcycle contrary to a pillion passenger condition  
  Drive without a properly attached and/or displayed number plate 
  Improper overtaking or passing  
  Turn or stop without signalling  
  Turn improperly  
  Fail to keep left (situations other than double lines) 
2 
  Exceed speed limit by less than 10 km/h*  
  Drive contrary to a minor defect notice  
  Fail to dip headlights  
  Drive at night or in hazardous weather conditions without appropriate 
lights on  
  Follow too closely 
1 
*Note - Some speeding offences also result in a licence suspension.  
 
Source: http://www.vicroads.vic.gov.au/Home/Licences/DemeritsAndOffences/DemeritPointsAndFines/DemeritPoints.htm  
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Appendix 4 
 
Learner Approved Motorcycle Scheme (LAMS): Victoria, Australia 
 
 international Transport Forum
2 rue André Pascal 
75775 Paris Cedex 16
itf.contact@oecd.org
www.internationaltransportforum.org